Middle East and West Asia

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The Middle East and West Asia (MEWA) region presents distinct and significant challenges with regard to the involvement of local and regional governments (LRGs) in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With a historical record of strong centralization and authoritarian regimes, the region has in recent years felt the impact of extensive conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen, and experienced high population growth and rapid urbanization.

With around 364 million inhabitants, the MEWA region is one of extreme heterogeneity. Thanks to their oil wealth, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — are among the wealthiest countries of the world with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, purchasing power parity, ranging from USD 50,526 to USD 154,008. The State of Palestine, Yemen and Afghanistan, meanwhile, are among the poorest (USD 4,885, USD 2,150 and USD 1,981 respectively). With the exception of Afghanistan and Yemen, the region is highly urbanized: 67% of its population live in cities. Jordan and the GCC countries are the most urbanized with nearly 84% of their populations living in urban settlements; Afghanistan and Yemen are the least urbanized with 27% and 35% respectively of their populations living in cities. Israel is not included in this analysis.

Large-scale migration from rural areas and the massive influx of refugees has accelerated urban growth, with a current annual growth rate of 2.6%). This has led to overcrowding of existing built areas and the growth of informal settlements. Climate change, in the context of fragile natural systems, has exacerbated access to basic services problems, particularly with regard to access to water, and thus the ability to provide an essential service. Over 50% of the population are under 25 and young workers aged 15-25 account for 20% of the labour force.³

While the discovery of oil in the 20th century gave Iraq and Iran substantial wealth that allowed them to develop an industrial base, the economic base of Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Yemen has been unable to keep up with population growth, and urban unemployment has generally risen. In some countries, Jordan and Palestine in particular, the remittances of expatriate workers in Gulf states and Western
Despite recurring conflicts, political turmoil and civil unrest, most countries had made significant economic progress. Europe have financed a rapid urbanization. Oil wealth has allowed the GCC countries to embark on ambitious development programmes and urban megaprojects that rival western models.

Since the beginning of the century, a succession of wars and sectarian conflict have afflicted large parts of the MEWA region. The State of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) is still under Israeli occupation and/or blockade. The civil war in Afghanistan caused massive destruction and displacements of vulnerable populations. Even though most of the 4.3 million people that fled to Iran and Pakistan have since returned, their need for shelter, services and economic integration is placing huge pressures on the local economy. In Iraq, the 2003 war caused widespread destruction in most cities, including Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul, and severe damage to the civilian infrastructure. The 2014 invasion of the Western part of the country by Da’esh fighters resulted in chaotic conditions, and cities as well as smaller towns and villages suffered extensive physical damage and devastation.

While Syria’s civil war shows signs of winding down, the destruction of national infrastructure and of urban areas has been massive. Refugees fleeing the conflict have moved to neighbouring countries with approximately 3.6 million refugees
in Turkey, 1.1 million in Lebanon, 630,000 in Jordan, 245,000 in Iraq, and 118,000 in Egypt. In Jordan and Lebanon, most refugees are living in densely settled urban areas, driving up housing costs and placing stress on available public services. One of the two poorest countries in the region, Yemen has been in the throes of a civil war since 2014, and over 22 million people — three-quarters of the population — forcibly displaced in multiple waves are in desperate need of aid and protection. An estimated 13.5 million people (including six million children) have been in need of one form or another of humanitarian aid: food, potable water, sanitation and waste disposal.

Despite recurring conflicts, political turmoil and civil unrest, most countries had made significant economic progress before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in early 2011. The conflict not only devastated Syria but also affected Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as displaced populations sought refuge and traditional regional economic ties were severed.

Jordan has borne much of the brunt of the crises at its borders. Wars and conflicts in neighbouring countries have resulted in waves of refugees and displaced persons, imposing serious economic challenges and fuelling an increase in poverty, unemployment rates and stresses on infrastructure and services. Jordan’s population in 2015 was 9.5 million, nearly 40% of whom were refugees, displaced by the four Arab-Israeli wars and granted Jordanian citizenship. In spite of the negative effect of regional conflicts, Jordan made remarkable progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The absolute poverty rate dropped from approximately 21% in 1990 to 14.4% in 2010.

It is a similar story in Lebanon. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Lebanon was second only to Jordan as a country of destination for Palestinian refugees, 504,000 of whom are currently registered by the United National Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA). As a result of the Syrian civil war, more than a million people displaced by the conflict have found refuge in Lebanon. The government estimates that the country now hosts 1.1 million refugees; this includes nearly one million Syrians registered with UNHCR, 31,000 Palestinians displaced from Syria, and 35,000 Lebanese returnees from Syria.

Based on this framework, this chapter provides a broad description and analysis of the challenges and opportunities for the implementation of the SDGs by LRGs in the MEWA region. The first part of the chapter describes the engagement with the SDG agenda at the national level, the participation of LRGs and the institutional context for SDG implementation, including recent trends regarding (de)centralization and the governance frameworks of LRGs, particularly as regards decision-making. The second part of the chapter focuses on the specific efforts of LRGs across the region to contribute to the SDGs, as well as those of local civil society and those supported by external actors. The analysis takes a comprehensive view of these initiatives, considering not only those explicitly identified with the SDGs, but also efforts whose outcomes are directly related to the SDGs, even if no explicit linkage to the framework is established in their formulation. The last section presents the main conclusions and potential next steps.
2. National and local institutional frameworks for the implementation of the SDGs
2.1 National frameworks

The MEWA region countries share a tradition of centralized systems of governance that inevitably influences the SDG implementation process. All countries in the region have similar multi-tiered governance structures: governorates, districts and municipalities in urbanized areas, and governorates and villages in rural areas. This multi-tiered system of governance is reflected in the institutional structures that are being created in each country for the implementation of the SDGs. With the exception of Syria and Yemen, SDG principles have been incorporated in current national development strategies (NDSs), with some modifications that reflect the Islamic values that prevail in many countries.

Twelve MEWA countries submitted their Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) to the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) in the 2016-2019 period. Almost all countries share the same mechanisms of follow-up and implementation of the SDGs: a high-level council of ministries; a national coordination committee; or a national commission for sustainable development, formed by various ministry-level representatives and usually led by one ministry in particular, often the one in charge of territorial or urban planning. Consultation processes and partnership methods are not always well-defined, even when a consultation process has been explicitly mentioned in the VNR. The participation of local governments is often determined by their legal position in the country’s political system, but mostly it is limited or even non-existent.

In Afghanistan, the primary SDG implementing agency is the Ministry of Economy, through its SDG Secretariat (SD). While the SD’s mission is to ensure a broad national participation and promote a sense of ownership among national stakeholders, all sub-national administrative entities are institutionally and financially dependent on the central government. Accurate data for setting baselines and annual targets for indicators are lacking and, since over half of government expenditure is dedicated to security, the country’s capacity to implement SDG policies remains limited. The 2017 VNR mentions the importance of SDG localization, while also highlighting that this can only be achieved after adoption at the national level.

In Iraq, the government has divided the 17 SDGs into eight socio-economic sectors: security, education, health, governance, infrastructure, social protection, agriculture and rural development, and economy. It has identified 169 specific national targets and 217 indicators. A Social Fund for Development has been established to support the implementation of the SDGs at the local level. Moreover, the central level has created an SDG National Coordination Commission, SDG Secretariat, Technical Coordination Committees, Technical Working Groups, and an SDG High-Level Board to ensure smoother implementation. The Global Initiative Towards a Sustainable Iraq (GITSI) is a further acknowledgement of the importance of including LRGs in the process.

The government of Iran has not yet declared when it will report to the HLPF. SDG stakeholders include the Sustainable Development Steering Council, the national legislature, local governments, academia, civil society, and the private sector.

In the GCC countries, the implementation of the SDGs is primarily the responsibility of
## Table 1 National strategies for integrating SDGs, coordination mechanisms and LRG participation

### Afghanistan
National Peace and Development Framework (2016-2021) and integrated in 22 National Priority Programmes (NPPs). Coordination: High Council of Minister (policy guidance), Executive Committee on the SDGs (in the Office of the Chief Executive – the President’s Office, and co-chaired by the Ministry of Economy), National Coordination Committee (inter-ministerial, include multi-stakeholder engagement) Technical Coordination Committee.

### Bahrain

### Iran
Iran has still not presented its VNR. It prepared the 6th National Five-Year Development Plan 2017-2022, and other sectoral plans (e.g. Climate Change Plan, Health Transformation Plan), and will prepare a national sustainable development strategy. Coordination: National Committee for Sustainable Development (but a new mechanism will be created).

### Iraq

### Jordan
Jordan 2025, Executive Development Programmes (EDPs, 2016-2019), Roadmap for SDG Implementation, thematic strategies (e.g. Economic Growth Plan 2018-2022). Coordination: Higher Steering Committee (headed by the Prime Minister’s Office), National Higher National Committee for Sustainable Development (created in 2002, headed by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation), Coordination Committee (oversees EDPs).

### Kuwait

### Lebanon
National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory (2009) but does not yet have a national integrated sustainable development framework. Coordination: National Committee for the SDGs, headed by the Prime Minister (multi-stakeholder).

### Oman

### Palestine (State of)
National Policy Agenda 2017-2022. Coordination: National SDG Team (headed by the Prime Minister), supported by 12 SDG working groups (multi-stakeholder).

### Qatar

### Saudi Arabia
Saudi Vision 2030, National Transformation Programme 2020 and sector-specific strategies (e.g. National Environmental Strategy, etc). Coordination: Council of Ministers (high-level political direction); Minister of Economy and Planning (coordination entity); Council of Economic and Development Affairs (tasked with the implementation of Vision 2030), Strategy Committee (proposes strategies for achieving Vision 2030).

### Turkey
10th and 11th National Development Plans (2014-2018 and 2019-2023) and Annual Programmes. Coordination: Presidency of Strategy and Budget (PSB), under the Turkish Presidency; Department of Environment and Sustainable Development (DESD) under PSB coordinates follow-up, monitoring and reporting. Turkstat produces the required data.

### United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Vision 2021 (adopted in 2005), Vision 2071 (UAE Centennial Strategy), launched in 2017, Emirates’ own national development plans (for five out of seven emirates), National Key Performance Indicators aligned with the SDGs. Coordination: National Committee on SDGs (chaired by the Minister of State for International Cooperation and by the chairwoman of the Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority).

### Middle East and West Asia

Sources: UNDESA, ‘Compendium of National Institutional Arrangements for the SDGs 2016-2017 and 2018’; VNRs; UCLG surveys.
national ministries. Qatar has aligned the SDGs with its own Qatar National Vision 2030. The Ministry of Development, Planning and Statistics (MDPS) is in charge of implementing both the National Vision 2030 and the SDGs, and has incorporated the 2030 Agenda in different sectors and established various dedicated task teams. At least eight municipalities have drafted spatial development plans.12

In Bahrain, SDG implementation is based on a government Plan of Action, under the responsibility of the National Information Committee, chaired by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and designed to bring together all units of the central government involved in SDG implementation, reporting through the National Statistical Office.13 The consultation process has involved community groups, civil society organizations (CSOs), and private sector, although there is no reference to the engagement of the country’s five governorates. While governorate councillors are in fact elected, governors are appointed by the monarchy: the Bahraini VNR, consequently, considered governorates as an extension of the national government.

Saudi Arabia reported in 2018 by adapting its Saudi Vision 2030 to the SDG framework. Implementation efforts are led by the Ministry of Economy and Planning, which is also the body in charge of reporting and data collection from other ministries and relevant stakeholders. The Saudi VNR puts emphasis on the private sector’s engagement in the SDG process as part of a trend of economic diversification. The role of LRGs in the process, however, is not clear: the consultation process was given no visibility, except for the Future Saudi Cities Programme, linked to the Saudi Vision 2030.

Kuwait’s approach to the SDGs has been guided by the ‘Kuwait Vision 2030’ and mainstreamed through the Kuwait National Development Plan (2015-2020). The National Sustainable Development Committee provides overall strategic leadership, with the collaboration of the General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Central Statistical Bureau. A National Observatory on Sustainable Development and Anticipation of the Future also plays a coordination role in follow-up, and was involved in the preparation of the VNR. It is expected to ensure the involvement of government entities, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders.14 In Oman, a National Committee for the SDGs was created under the High-Level Council on Planning, and the SDGs were integrated in the long-term ‘Oman 2040’ plan and the 9th Development Plan 2016-2020.

Jordan’s Higher National Steering Committee provides overall strategic guidance for the implementation of the SDGs (with the broad aim of reducing poverty to 8% by 2015 and 7% by 2030), including consultations with stakeholders. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation is in charge of reporting progress. In Lebanon, a national committee to implement the SDGs was formed in 2017, with members including ministerial officials, and representatives from CSOs and the private sector. This is chaired by the Prime Minister. Sub-committees monitor the implementation of each thematic component. While workshops were held for central government agencies, the private sector and CSOs, none was held for LRGs.15 Although Palestine has incorporated the SDGs in its national strategy and submitted a VNR in 2018, little progress has been achieved because of limited resources and the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and blockade of Gaza. No specific SDG-based consultative process with local governments has yet been established.16

Turkey was the first MEWA country to submit a VNR in 2016 and again in 2019. Turkey’s national development plan (NDP) was prepared by the Ministry of Development (MoD). The government, however, has since been restructured in the framework of the amendment of the Turkish Constitution (2017). The Presidency of Strategy and Budget (PSB) under the President’s Office is now the focal point for sustainable development. The Department of Environment and Sustainable Development (DESD) under PSB coordinates follow-up, monitoring and reporting, supported by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). Different ministries ensure coordination for each SDG.17 The 2016 VNR granted little space to local governments. For the preparatory process of the 2019 VNR, however, the national local government association (LGA), the Union of Municipalities of Turkey (UMT), was nominated to coordinate and collect information from LRGs. ☞
As mentioned throughout this chapter, the countries of the MEWA region are characterized by a high degree of centralization, with only very few exceptions. This also applies to the various tiers of local government: provincial governors tend to have substantial powers over municipal governments, either through the direct appointment of local authorities or the delivery of local services, or even both in many cases.

Afghanistan is still a primarily rural country: only 27% of its population were classified as urban in 2015. Its structure is organized into 34 provinces, 399 districts, 150 municipalities and about 40,000 villages (see Table 2). Tribal councils (jirgas), moreover, play a governance role across various levels. Provincial governors are still appointed by the central government almost in spite of existing laws that already establish their electability. Local elections have generally not been held since the end of the Afghan wars: one in five municipal posts is currently vacant. Municipalities implement national plans and policies. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (established in 2007 as a governmental entity) works as a ‘compulsory’ LGA and theoretically provides opportunities for citizen participation through the establishment of Provincial Councils, Community Development Councils (CDCs) and District Development Assemblies. The latter two entities, both of which are part of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) structure, assess community needs at the local level and design development projects accordingly.

Iran is organized into 31 provinces (ostan) and 324 municipalities (shahrdarihah) — which include cities (10,000 inhabitants or more), towns, districts and villages. Provinces, cities, towns and villages have directly elected councils (shora). At the national level, a Higher Council of Provincial Councils was established in 2003. Provinces are headed by a governor appointed by the Ministry of Interior, and municipalities by a mayor elected by the local councils. The appointment of mayors is subject to the Minister of Interior’s approval. From a legal point of view, municipalities and town councils are defined as ‘non-governmental, public organizations’. They are considered part of the political system but not of the governmental structure. In spite of the calls for more decentralization in the country’s third NDP (2001-2005), decision-making for local infrastructure planning and public services has generally been top-down; many basic services are managed directly by their respective ministries, and the authority of local governments is easily overridden by the Ministry of Interior. Villages are in general not granted sufficient resources or competences to fulfill service-related tasks, and are thus reduced to consultative bodies.

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution established a federal state system, followed by a dedicated law on local authorities (2008), which gave formal autonomy to the country’s 18 governorates, three of which (Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah) subsequently associated to form the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), based on article 199 of the Constitution. The KRG in fact is the only regional government that benefits from a high degree of autonomy. Elections to the governorate councils were held in 2009 and 2013, but responsibilities have yet to be fully transferred to them, with central ministries still managing water, electricity, and sanitation. Governorate budgets rely on redistributed oil revenue through budget allocations from the central government and, in some cases, on their own petroleum revenues or fees. The priorities determining the allocation of resources are still set at the ministerial level. Governorate councils, 69 cities (baladiyah) with more than 10,000 inhabitants and 120 districts (qadaa) have elected local councils, which in turn choose their own executives. The governorate councils have extensive power over the lower local councils within the same governorate in the execution of local projects. The capital Baghdad itself is a discrete territory. At the same time, municipalities locally represent the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works. Inevitably, the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the improvement of security are two key issues facing local authorities.

In a very different context, all six countries in the GCC are centralized monarchies and essentially, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, city-states. Their local councils, composed of
both elected and appointed members, are primarily advisory bodies. Ministries set national, regional and local urban policies, while the power of municipal authorities is generally restricted. **Kuwait** has endowed sub-national authorities with some executive powers: the Kuwait Municipality now enjoys decision-making powers related to licensing, health and safety in workplaces, and the planning and approval of infrastructural projects. **Bahrain** is divided into five governorates, each headed by a governor, in charge of development-related economic and social regional policies. In 2002, moreover, Bahrain held its first local elections since 1957. Governorate councils are elected but governors are still appointed by the central government. In October 2011, the Sultanate of **Oman** announced the establishment of municipal councils (wilayah) in all of its 11 governorates. Until then, only the capital city of Muscat had had a council — whose members were however all appointed. Local elections were eventually held in December 2012, although via the expression of nominal preferences, since national law forbids the establishment of political parties. At the regional level, governorates are led by appointed walis (governors), who report directly to the Ministry of the Interior. As the Ministry of Regional Municipalities and Environment maintains control over municipal budget and administration, Omani municipalities enjoy very limited autonomy. **Qatar**'s elected Central Municipal council, created in 1999, is purely advisory. In the **UAE**, a number of federal and local regulations have been implemented in recent years. The membership of the Federal National Council, on the other hand, is half-elected and half-appointed. The first council elections were held in 2006. Local administrations each have an executive council, which reports to the Ruler’s Court of each specific Emirate. The capital Abu Dhabi has its own executive council, currently chaired by the Crown Prince.

The largest country in this group, **Saudi Arabia**, has a more conventional territorial organization: it includes 13 provinces, led by governors; municipalities report to governors for the delivery of local services. Over the last ten years, there has been evidence of the role of local authorities expanding somewhat. The country’s shift towards more administrative de-concentration includes the establishment of regional authorities (amanat) and the enhancement of the institutional capacity of local agencies. Elections — limited to half the membership of local councils — were held in 2005, 2011 and 2015. The local councils have been given nominal planning and development responsibilities and are specifically responsible for public health, the management of public space, and the issuance of building permits. However, they do not enjoy comparable financial autonomy: the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs has dominated the formulation and implementation of urban policy. Although local councils prepare local master plans and monitor their implementation, ministries still have the power to overrule local decisions. Similarly, central government transfers still account for 70% of local expenditures.

In **Yemen**, conversely, most local councils — perceived as a continuation of the previous regime — have been inactive since the outbreak of conflict in 2015. In the country’s northern territories, however, local tribes are de facto local bodies, and tribal councils have remained active. As of 2000, Yemen had three levels of government: the national government, governorates at the regional level, and districts at the municipal level. Their organization is mandated by the Local Authority Law, which came into force in 2000. However, even though the text of the law imposes the direct election of district and governorate councillors, these posts have always been appointed by national governments. Ultimately, studies show that the current regulation of local government is now either in conflict or redundant with at least 80 other pieces of legislation covering a range of different issues.

Similarly, since 2011, **Syria** has experienced one of the worst and most heavily documented conflicts in the world. Traditionally, and formally at least since 1963, the country adopted a strictly centralized form of state. Nonetheless, and with the support of the European Union in particular, the country was able to begin the slow yet major modernization of its municipal administrative system. With the start of the civil war, the ensuing collapse of an effective political system has engendered a multiplicity of administrative systems in the areas not controlled by governmental forces. Military or civilian leaders in different zones are retaining control over territorial organization, thus fostering — to a certain extent — the emergence of more localized initiatives, also with the support of tribal, religious and family-clan leadership in certain areas.

The situation with territorial organization and (re-)centralizing trends is quite different in the other countries of the Levant. **Jordan** is divided into 12 governorates, each headed by a muhafaz (governor) reporting directly to the Ministry of Interior. Since the 2007 Municipal Act, 93 local...
municipal councils are elected for a mandate of four years, with the exception of the Greater Amman Municipality, whose mayor and half the municipal council are appointed by the Cabinet. Municipalities are ruled by elected officials but still placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Since August 2015, members of the governorate councils have also been elected, but governors remain appointed.34 Jordan’s 2015 Decentralization Law, on the other hand, sought to mobilize more inclusive participation. Women, for example, are guaranteed 20% of the seats on municipal councils.35 Citizen participation in local governance, however, is still limited even though the government has started to engage civil society and solicited input on national policy through formal dialogues, in an attempt to strengthen civil society’s role as a policy-making partner.

In Lebanon, the Taif Agreement — which the Lebanese parliament approved in 1989 and marked the end of the Lebanese civil war — resulted in an extensive decentralization process. The country today is divided into eight administrative governorates, 26 sub-regions (Qadaa) and 1,018 municipalities. These can associate in Municipal Unions (currently 51 of them exist). New legislation enacted in 2014 has decentralized urban governance even further: accordingly, municipalities are now financially independent, although their activities must be coordinated with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Central transfers, on the other hand, still account for 40% of municipal revenues. An additional 14% is received as a loan from the Cities and Villages Development Bank. Citizen participation in local governance is still minimal, even in spite of the recent governmental efforts to engage more with civil society. Beirut, the capital city, has a unique system, in which the (elected) mayor retains certain policy-making powers while sharing the executive power with an (appointed) governor.36

The unique geographic and administrative structure of Palestine is the consequence of its particular history and status. It is divided into two main geographical units: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This spatial configuration has led to a relative autonomy in terms of municipal authority, also considering the impact of territorial fragmentation as caused by the Israeli occupation. Today urban governance is largely decentralized and elected local authorities are responsible for the provision of basic services and planning, managing growth within their boundaries, providing basic services (e.g. water, power) and granting of building permits. In 2005 and 2006, there was a rise of agglomeration into joint councils for shared service provision and development planning. At the national level, the Municipal Development and Lending Fund (MDLF), established in 2005, provides municipalities with grants and loan guarantees and programmes to strengthen their financial management capabilities. It has channelled significant funding from international donors for municipal infrastructure, capacity development, and other municipal activities.

Turkey, a founding member of the Council of Europe and an active member of its Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, is the most decentralized country in the region. In 2004, the Turkish parliament adopted a comprehensive decentralization reform as part of its process of integration with the European Union. Local authorities enjoy both financial and administrative autonomy. There are three types of local government: villages, municipalities and special provincial administrations (SPAs). Following the 2014 Metropolitan Reform, the number of local governments with greater powers fell from 2,930 to 1,398, especially in the case of metropolitan municipalities.37 As of December 2014, Turkey also comprises 18,362 villages as the lowest tier of local administration. The new presidential form of government (following the referendum of April 2017) has not affected the local government system. Central oversight issues remain, which can affect the clarity of the relationship between the local and central levels of governance.

### Evolution of key functions and responsibilities of LRGs

Actual capacity to implement the SDGs locally is inevitably linked to the distribution of responsibilities, power and resources between national and local governance levels. Many countries of the MEWA region are disadvantaged by a legal and administrative framework that fails to address the lack of transparency and clarity in the allocation and way in which tasks and labour are distributed among central, local and private actors and sectors.

This lack of clarity about responsibilities and relationships between the central government, municipalities and other related local departments, has generally resulted in institutional competition and duplication. In Lebanon, for example, the Municipal Law devolves planning competences to municipalities, while at the same time the Urban Planning Code gives them only a consultative role in the implementation of plans and the national Directorate-General for Urban Planning prepares or reviews all urban master plans.38 Moreover, while the 1977 municipal reform (Law 118) gives municipalities a broad range of tasks, nearly 70% of the country’s 1,108 municipalities are small towns with structurally limited capacity to ensure basic service provision.39 Thus, most functions related to urban development and infrastructure project implementation are supervised by a district commissioner (qa’im maqam). Pooling resources and enhancing decisional and implementation capacity are incentives for many small Lebanese
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>System</th>
<th>Number of LRGs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Presidential Islamic Republic</td>
<td>34 Provinces (wilayet) 399 Districts 153 Municipalities Roughly 40,020 Villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Constitutional Hereditary Monarchy</td>
<td>5 Governorates (muhafazat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Islamic Republic</td>
<td>31 Provinces (ostan) 324 Cities (shehristan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Parliamentary Republic</td>
<td>18 Governorates (muhafazat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Constitutional Monarchy with Representative Government</td>
<td>12 Governorates 100 Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Constitutional Emirate</td>
<td>6 Governorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democratic Republic</td>
<td>8 Governorates (muhafazat) 25 Districts (qadaa, qaza) 1,108 Municipalities (baladiyya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Absolute Monarchy</td>
<td>11 Governorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Emirate</td>
<td>8 Municipalities (baladiyya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Unitary Absolute Monarchy</td>
<td>13 Provinces 60 Centres (markaz) for each province 43 Secondary Governorates (muhafazat) for each province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td>187 Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>14 Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Presidential Parliamentarian System</td>
<td>1,398 Municipalities 51 Provincial Administrations 18,362 Village Administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Federation of 7 Emirates</td>
<td>7 Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Multi-party Parliamentary System</td>
<td>22 Governorates 333 Districts 2,210 Municipalities 38,234 Villages</td>
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municipalities to establish municipal unions, as mentioned above.

Recentralizing trends have hindered competence devolution in Jordan over the past few years. Even though the current regulations of the Municipal Act do assign a diverse range of competences to the local level, the central government has tended to either centralize or even privatize some municipal competences such as water and electricity provision, school and health systems. Joint Service Councils have been established from the top down by the Ministry of Interior to coordinate service provision in clusters of municipalities and villages — with the aim of achieving economy of scale and making certain services (and waste management in particular) more efficient — such as in the Petra region or special economic zones such as Aqaba. The gubernatorial level maintains coordination among local governments, and has the power to intervene in municipal affairs and decisions.

The territorial and administrative fragmentation of the State of Palestine described above is seen in the inconsistent distribution of competences and powers to local authorities across the state’s territory. Following the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, the Palestinian territory in the West Bank was ultimately divided into three Areas: A, B, and C. Area C territory is de facto under Israeli control, not only in terms of its political administration and security, but even as far as urban and territorial zoning and planning are concerned. It accounts for about 60% of the whole of the West Bank. All this considered, the Local Authorities Law of the State of Palestine identifies a wide range of tasks that are the Association of Palestinian Local Authorities’ (APLA) responsibility. Some municipalities have even taken on additional tasks, such as providing emergency services and the construction and maintenance of schools. Between 2005 and 2006, several joint councils were created to guarantee more effective service provision and development planning. However, due to the limited capacities of most local governments in the area, CSOs have played an important role in supplying health, education, and relief services, especially to the poorest groups of the population and those affected by the conflict.

The status of competence allocation and devolution in West Asia is more varied. The Afghan Government introduced a Sub-National Government Policy (LRGSP) in 2010, which aims to devolve certain central powers to local authorities. This document includes roles and responsibilities of Afghan local governments in various fields, such as justice, security, roads, water, sanitation, natural resources management, infrastructure, agriculture, education and energy, among others.40 The Ministry of Urban Development, however, has planning oversight of local administrations’ decision-making. In Iran, on the other hand, municipalities enjoy both direct responsibilities and shared responsibilities with higher levels of governance. Locally however, municipal offices and mayors have a limited or no role in the provision of many basic services. In the case of urban planning, for example, municipalities are generally tasked with the development and follow-up of projects that are usually defined and designed directly by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. Finally, in Iraq, district (qadaa) and sub-district (nahiya) councils have taken on several responsibilities of public service delivery to respond to local needs and interests, but most services remain under the central government's control. Following the country's structural political reform, governorates now manage and deliver most of the tasks related to the urban system. Accordingly, overlapping of authority and responsibility is still a fundamental problem in the relationship between federal and local governments, as well as a hindrance in terms of transparency and resource allocation.

The centralized nature of task and competence distribution in the Gulf countries has led to a relatively unusual picture in the sub-region. Emirati municipalities are in charge of daily urban service management but only as part of an ever-tighter distribution of tasks within the federal system, which remains largely in the hands of each Emirate's government. In Oman, municipal councils have no specific competence other than providing recommendations for the delivery of urban services. Over the last few decades, several municipal responsibilities in Kuwait were in fact re-centralized, although municipal councils are still responsible for certain services — including roads, urban planning, sanitation, garbage disposal, food safety, licensing, environmental protection, and housing.41 Yemeni municipalities traditionally had little leeway when it came to local powers and responsibilities. A process of decentralization began in 2001 with the entry into force of a law on local authorities, which devolved most administrative tasks and competences to the local level. An amendment to the law was a step forward also in terms of the democratization of the appointment and accountability of governance.

Lack of clarity about relationships between the central government, municipalities and other related local departments, has generally resulted in institutional competition and duplication.
local representatives. However, the President’s office, as early as 2011, overturned most of these arrangements, returning the lion’s share of policy control from the local level to central government. Finally, with the onset of the civil war in 2014 and the Saudi-led invasion of 2015, Yemeni municipalities found themselves in the unprecedented position of abandoning most local policy-making and focusing primarily on guaranteeing the supply of food and medicine to their communities.

In Turkey, on the other hand, municipal competences include an extensive range of tasks and responsibilities, with the exception inevitably of several basic national competences such as border security, justice and compulsory education. The Turkish system, however, still has certain overlaps in labour distribution between local governments and sectoral ministries. There have also been some instances of competence devolution by central government to local authorities, who have in turn rejected this due to bureaucratic difficulties in managing these tasks. Municipalities larger than 50,000 inhabitants, for example, have a legal obligation to provide sheltered housing for women and children; however, even after building the infrastructure (and thus complying with the law), and due to their limited capacity and the process’s complexity, many municipalities are transferring the management and maintenance of shelters back to the Ministry of Family and Social Affairs. Similarly, in an attempt to rationalize their tasks, many municipalities have resorted to creating municipal unions, entities supported by specific national legislation: 789 such unions exist, sharing competences in a diverse range of fields, from geothermal energy production, to health and tourism.

Finally, urban legislation and regulations may have a very important role to play in preparing MEWA countries for the introduction of the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda in an otherwise slowly evolving system. However, most urban planning and management laws, rules and regulations remain obsolete and have not been able to respond adequately to the needs (and challenges) of local governments willing to take on this task.

Local and regional governments finance

Inadequate access, delivery and provision of basic services and infrastructure have obstructed a real opportunity to achieve the SDGs and their targets in the MEWA region. A thorough revision of financial resources and their allocation across levels of governance is essential to overcoming this challenge. There are many obstacles in the way of LRGs’ finance systems across the region. Generally speaking in the MEWA region Turkey and Palestine are probably the most decentralized in terms of the spending capacity of their local governments. Countries such as Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon are lagging behind in this regard, while Gulf countries are as a rule so centralized that sub-national finance still depends largely on national decision-making. In most MEWA countries, however, the current institutional framework does not invest local governments with their own adequate revenues (be they taxes, fees or charges), making them unable to autonomously fund their expenditures. Increasing urbanization, on the one hand, has put even more financial pressure on local governments. Meanwhile obsolete institutional and regulatory frameworks, on the other, have made it even harder to recover their fair share of public services’ operating costs or offset the impact of rising property value in urban contexts. This has ultimately most benefitted the private sector. Moreover, and generally across the entire MEWA region, an inadequate regulatory framework has limited local governments’ access to alternative sources of funding and finance. Most MEWA local governments cannot legally issue municipal bonds, implement land-value capture models, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), value-based zoning mechanisms, or many other financial options which would require a step forward in financial decentralization for these to be accessible locally.

Similarly, local taxes and fees have so far played a minor part in the financing of local governance, systematically hindered by inefficient collection mechanisms. Very few countries in the MEWA region really enjoy any degree of autonomy in the management of their own local revenues. Although municipalities in Iran, Jordan, Turkey and Palestine are in fact able to generate income through property taxes, their share of local revenues (with the exception of Turkey) is still limited. On the other hand, real-estate tax rates in Turkey, for example, are still set centrally by the Council of Ministers, with no engagement of municipalities. There are some positive examples, however: the city of Şanlıurfa, for example, doubled its tax revenue in one year by monitoring collection with improved IT systems.

Although municipal revenues in Iran increased eight-fold during the period 2006-2013, these came mostly from land sales and building permits. Meanwhile, over the past 45 years, the share of own revenue in the income of Tehran Municipality fell from about 40% to 20%. Iranian cities have accordingly faced significant financial constraints in their ability to support the implementation of the SDGs. Similarly, in Iraq, even though Iraqi governorates were granted the right to levy taxes, a judicial action has suspended this prerogative, leaving them highly dependent on central transfers. The system of tax collection, moreover, is strongly centralized. Specifically, in the case of the Iraqi economy, the Ministry of Finance has...
been trying to retain control of the local budget, which has been spent entirely on reconstruction.

The current situation is even starker in the Gulf countries, where municipalities have basically behaved as implementing agencies for National Urban Policies (NUPs). With few exceptions, local governments in the Gulf have no direct taxing or borrowing powers and are dependent on central transfers for funding infrastructure and public service provision. Inevitably, any initiative to implement the SDGs needs to be centralized, top-down, and an integral part of the national development strategies. In Bahrain, for example, the budget allocated to governorates is agreed at the central level and managed as part of the overall budget of the Ministry of Interior. In many Gulf countries, moreover, the wealth engendered by oil and hydrocarbons has allowed national governments to adopt single-handedly a specific model of urban planning and development, based mostly on ambitious megaprojects that rival — though more in appearance than function — a stereotypical image of the Western metropolis. This model of top-down urban development leaves the city, to a certain extent, devoid of its own main primary functions. In Saudi Arabia, for example, business licence and advertising fees and building permits are the only real source of income for local governments, while only a handful of cities — Riyadh, Jeddah, and the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah — are granted the capacity to manage local finance and maintain a local budget. Some cities, however, are seeking revenue from municipal land property to raise additional financial resources, and have been experimenting with PPPs to attract private investment. In an apparent acknowledgement of the urgency of this issue, Saudi Arabia’s national Vision 2030 plan is now specifically addressing municipal finance.

In Lebanon, local governments cannot create additional taxes nor can they make changes to the tax base since they only have limited control of fee levels. While they collect up to 36 different kinds of fees, the cost of the collection process has been higher than the income obtained (direct fees represent around 40% of local revenues). In Jordan, revenues raised by municipalities represent 43% of total local revenues. Municipalities have some control of some fees (e.g. waste collection, building permits), and property tax. Most Jordanian municipalities, however, face budget deficits, mostly due to the inability to compensate for expenditure on salaries and local infrastructure maintenance (e.g. transport, roads and waste management). In the State of Palestine, on the other hand, local governments have maintained a certain degree of control over both the tax rate and the tax base. Inevitably, however, the current military occupation, the territorial fragmentation and the lack of actual control over border security and functioning have vastly affected the ability of local governments to collect a stable amount of own revenue, and they have relied extensively on foreign aid. At the national level, the MDLF, established in 2005, provides municipalities with grants and loan guarantees, as well as programmes to strengthen their financial management capabilities. In Turkey, finally, local taxes and fees represent around 30% of local revenues.

With regard to the remaining components of local budgets, local governments in most MEWA countries ultimately depend to a high degree on transfers from central governments: 70% of local revenue in Turkey come via grants, about 40% in Jordan. Palestine and Afghanistan are the only exceptions: in the former, the mechanism of grant and transfer has been inefficient due to the systemic issue in the organization of the country; in the latter, centre-to-local transfers are not established, and local governments are structurally without their own financial sources. The centrality of transfers for the sustainability of local finance also highlights the importance of the criteria according to which national governments allocate resources via grants — as well as any flexibility that LRGs have to use these funds. Several countries have traditionally adopted pre-set allocation formulas: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The other governments in the region, however, define these criteria via centrally led national negotiations in which LRGs are generally not included. In Iran, on the other hand, where transfers are allocated on a yearly basis, 60% of development transfers are earmarked for specific projects, and only 40% are left discretionary for the recipient. In Iraq, central transfers are still essential for the sustainability of local government. They are allocated, however, in a highly unbalanced way: the four governorates included in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) — due to the particular status of this union as the country’s only autonomous region — receive about 17% of the national budget via grants; the remaining fifteen governorates combined only receive about 5%.

Clearer allocation criteria and formulas are not necessarily conducive to more effective local finance. In most cases, metropolitan areas have been benefitting more than intermediary cities or smaller towns from intergovernmental transfers. More specifically, because of the
extreme conditions imposed by the Syrian conflict on the whole region, transfer schemes and criteria have failed to take into consideration the sudden and dramatic change brought about by the refugee crisis. In Turkey, for example, a large city such as Gaziantep — on the Turkish-Syrian border, hosting over 400,000 refugees with a local population of about 1.5 million — receives transfer allocations about 14 times lower than Kocaeli, on the Marmara Sea, with a similar population but a much lower impact of refugee fluxes.\(^{57}\) At a much lower scale, but with similar dynamics, transfer schemes also penalize affected territories and communities — one way or the other — by growing commuter flows among cities. Lebanese municipalities have met with the same set of challenges, as they have come to host over 1.4 million Syrian refugees.\(^{58}\) The country’s Independent Municipal Fund, a governmental agency in charge of fund allocation, has often been criticized for unpredictable transfers and inadequate criteria, hindering territorial equality.

Consequently, municipalities across the MEWA region have tried to find alternative sources of financial support. The simplest option for most local governments is borrowing from domestic banks or special purpose funds. Jordanian cities, for example, have made up 14% of their budgets through loans from the Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB). Longer-term financing is more difficult to obtain in non-oil producing countries in the region. Loans from international institutions require sovereign guarantees and carry foreign-exchange risks. Moreover, borrowing from multilateral banks or international financial markets is often hindered by the lack of quality data and transparency in the financial system, which increases credit risks to an unsustainable level. In most MEWA countries, the existing legislation does not allow for the issuance of municipal bonds and attempts to instate this have been sporadic. In Turkey, the city of Antalya did plan a municipal bond initiative, but this was frustrated by the bureaucratic requirements of the process. On the other hand, Iran’s experience has been relatively positive, in this regard: both Tehran and Tabriz have implemented municipal bond initiatives successfully.\(^{59}\)

Lack of financial autonomy, transparency and alternative options have curbed the capacity of MEWA LRGs to fund themselves, their activities and — inevitably — also their mobilization for the SDGs. In fact, the extensive reliance on short-term funds, has led to a general financial weakness, and many national governments in the region have used this to leverage more municipal amalgamation. In Jordan alone, over 300 municipalities were joined into 93 municipalities.\(^{60}\) In 2014, Turkey amalgamated 2,950 municipalities into 1,398. \(*)\)
2.3. Multilevel governance mechanisms and trends for stakeholder involvement

The historical legacy of centralized administration has remained solidly embedded in the political system of the MEWA countries. It still influences city management and the mechanisms of urban and territorial governance. Across the region, the predominance of centralizing models and initiatives has paved the way to territorial coordination via hierarchical processes rather than co-ownership, negotiation or inclusive consultation.

Inevitably, this has also affected the role and effectiveness of national LGAs, making representation of local governments in national decision-making even weaker. An important exception is Turkey, where the UMT, established in 1945, has a consultative role in the drafting of legislation and holds one seat in the Presidential Local Government Commission. In Lebanon, a Committee of Mayors, gathering the representatives of the country’s major cities, has been active since 1995.

Although many countries in the region have established a separate ministry addressing local government matters, concrete impact and change have been negligible. In Iran, the Office of Councils and Social Affairs within the Ministry of Interior oversees all municipal councils. Although mayors are elected by the councils, they are still vastly dependent on the Department of Municipal Affairs within the ministry. Line ministries are in charge of local services and policies in their respective fields, a mechanism that has frequently led to a lack of coordination among decision-makers formalized, to a certain extent, within often contradictory regulations. This trend has impeded the establishment of a consistent local government model or system across the region.

In Iraq, for example, governorate councils have extensive power over lower local councils in the implementation of local projects: at the administrative level, more generally, mayors need the approval of governors for any activities within
the municipal jurisdiction. In Jordan, the Ministry of Interior is the main authority in charge of local governments’ functioning and activity, even though municipalities are formally under the control of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. After the adoption of the country’s Decentralization Law (2015), the central government created in 2016 eight different ministerial committees and one central committee to assist local policy implementation. The role of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs — in the framework of the decentralization process — is expected to be reduced, focusing more on consultation and capacity-building, rather than strict policy supervision.\textsuperscript{61} In Lebanon, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities is in charge of local administration and exerts administrative supervision over municipal councils — including financial control — through Governors (Muhafizes).

They can suspend municipal decisions for three months. The Ministry is also responsible for planning, budgeting and expenditure of municipal revenue. The Palestinian Ministry of Local Government is in charge of the oversight of local authorities. The central government has been attempting to pool municipal services via intercommunal entities — the Joint Services Councils (JSCs) — to overcome the practical difficulties many local administrations meet in the delivery of basic services. In Turkey, a new General Directorate of Local Government was established in 2017 under the Ministry of Urbanization and Environment.

Finally, in the MEWA region most legal frameworks for citizen mobilization have been historically weak, and participatory channels have been either inadequate or non-existent. While mayors can play a pivotal role in creating a culture of participation in their cities, their actions seldom go beyond formal policy practices. Participation, however, varies across the region. In Afghanistan, the sub-national governance framework adopted since 2010 acknowledges the citizen’s right to participate in decision-making, but in practice most decisions are still based on informal political ties. In Iran, the level of public participation in municipal decisions is very low, and official mobilization channels are limited to the election of local councillors. In Lebanon, public participation in urban planning and development remains marginal, but has been improving: in 2016, a platform set up by NGOs under the slogan of ‘Beirut My City’ won 37% of the votes in the capital. The winner-take-all electoral system left the movement with no representation in the city council, but it won international acclaim.\textsuperscript{62} In Jordan, the central government is currently working on a new framework to enable citizens to define and share their preferred projects. In Turkey, municipal elections are still the main institutional channel of participation: citizens vote for their mayor and for candidate lists linked to political parties, however in most cases without any information available about the councillors they are supporting.

A specific challenge of the MEWA region, but also an area in which (modest) progress has been achieved, is women’s participation in sub-national politics. Saudi Arabia granted female citizens the right to participate in local politics in 2015: since then, 21 women candidates have won seats in Saudi municipal councils.\textsuperscript{63} In 2018, Bahrain’s monarchy appointed two Bahraini women as director-generals of the Capital and Northern Municipalities. In Iran, a campaign to increase the number of woman-held seats in local legislatures led to the election of 415 women to city councils across the province of Sistan-Balochistan in the 2017 elections, up from 185 in the previous election. In Iraq’s second election for governorate councils in 2013, 117 women were elected for a total of 440 seats, seven more than in the 2009 elections.\textsuperscript{64}

Ultimately, because of its history and traditional institutional setting, the MEWA region as a whole presents significant challenges for the implementation and achievement of the SDGs, and in particular for the active participation of LRGs in the process. The region is characterized by widening disparities in development levels and enduring armed conflict, making it even harder for poorer and war-torn countries, such as Yemen or Afghanistan, to conceptualize — let alone implement and achieve — the SDG targets locally. Despite its heterogeneity, the MEWA region still has a common trend that emerges across all countries in that historically it rewards strong political centralization: this is limiting authority, autonomy and capacity (including but not limited to financial resources) of LRGs in all MEWA countries. Accordingly, their ability to advance in policy-making and either adapt to or introduce the SDGs in their activities is severely limited. This notwithstanding, it is important to emphasize that many LRGs in the MEWA region have sought ways to introduce and localize the SDGs in their territories and communities — often in opposition to the constraints imposed by their national systems. The second part of this chapter explores and analyses these efforts in more detail.
3. The contribution of local and regional governments to the localization of the SDGs
3.1 Promoting local ownership to localize the SDGs

There is plenty of evidence of the importance of local governments and their national associations in the successful localization of the SDGs from around the world. While the SDGs as a framework are inherently intergovernmental and their realization tied to national policies, budget and political will, the achievement of most Goals still depends extensively on the cooperation, commitment and participation of local and regional authorities. SDG 11 on ‘inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’ cities and human settlements, for example, acknowledges the transformative power of sustainable urbanization and the impact that local governments can have on driving (global) change from the bottom up.

The implementation of a complex and comprehensive Goal such as SDG 11 requires not only improvements in the delivery of basic services (health, education, water and food security, energy, among others), but also access to inclusive economic opportunities and the protection of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable groups. While the resources for this would in most countries be allocated by national governments, the design and successful implementation of specific programmes are a local responsibility and require true cross-level co-ownership, participation and mobilization of local communities, actors and stakeholders.

Not surprisingly, considering the region’s traditionally centralized political and administrative structures, local governments have only rarely — and only in a few countries of the region — actively participated in the process of implementing the SDGs, as well as in the preparation of the VNRs. This can partly be explained by the still limited development and presence of LGAs and networks across the region: the job of intermediating across governance tiers and representing the shared interests of local authorities performed by associations and networks can be a valuable enabler for local governments to gain visibility and centrality in SDG-related decision-making. Turkey, Lebanon and Palestine are essentially the only MEWA countries with a developed, established network of local government associations and organizations. Turkish local governments have come together in the UMT, which has to date been included in the community of partners invited to all the national events related to either the SDGs or the Turkish government’s VNR for the United Nations. Since 2017, the UMT has taken on the task of circulating information and knowledge about the SDG framework to all Turkey’s mayors and municipalities.

The Mersin Metropolitan Municipality and the municipalities of Nilüfer (zmir province), Nevşehir and Bakırköy (a municipality in the larger conglomeration of Istanbul) have organized several SDG-related workshops. Seferiçitar, in the zmir province, created a webpage for reporting practices and examples of local implementation. The municipalities (and Istanbul districts) of Bakırköy, Esenler and Maltepe have already developed their own local reports on the SDGs. The Regional Municipal Union of Marmara has organized workshops and seminars on the SDGs for its member municipalities. Several NGOs have also been active in monitoring and promoting municipal activities in support of SDG implementation: the Yereliz (‘We are local’) Association created an online reporting system that maps local government efforts in support of SDG targets and their achievement. The Maya Sustainable Development Agency has organized local workshops and conferences to raise awareness among local stakeholders and communities.

The national government — via the Presidential Directorate in charge of the realization of Turkey’s VNR for the 2019 HLPF — has shown an increasing willingness to engage the local level. The UMT was selected as the coordinating institution for local administrations contributing to the reporting process and bringing to the table the experiences of LRGs in the country. The UMT directly engaged with 50 municipalities in the process, while reaching out to over 1,400 municipalities for them to

The implementation of the SDGs requires improvements in the delivery of basic services and the protection of vulnerable groups.
Directorate of Local Authorities in Afghanistan has assisted in the creation of the Independent politically. Using a similar process, the World Bank projects, it is still in its infancy institutionally and LGA has been active in conferences and specific central governments. Although the Iraqi national concerns and priorities to reach regional and supported the process of establishing a national Energy. UCLG has maintained an active presence in international initiatives, particularly on issues networks of local authorities and in the effort of granting their members increasing visibility on the international stage.

In Lebanon, the Bureau Technique des Villes Libanaises (BTVL, Technical Office of Lebanese Cities), also known as Cités Unies Liban (United Cities Lebanon), has a membership of 66 municipalities and 22 federations of municipalities, comprising 80% of the country’s population. The country’s largest municipalities collaborate under the aegis of BTVL. However, when the national government prepared its VNR for the 2018 HLPF, the municipalities of the BTFL were informed, but not invited to contribute to the process. When the State of Palestine presented its 2018 VNR, the national LGA was neither informed nor involved in the process. The Association of Palestinian Local Authorities (APLA), however, has been particularly active in the territory. It has established the Palestinian City Managers Network (PCMN), which involves higher-level administrators responsible for running the day-to-day operations of Palestinian municipalities, and has historically been proactive in global networks of local authorities and in the effort of granting their members increasing visibility on the international stage.

In Iraq, UN-Habitat has monitored and supported the process of establishing a national LGA to improve information and experience exchange among municipalities, channelling their concerns and priorities to reach regional and central governments. Although the Iraqi national LGA has been active in conferences and specific projects, it is still in its infancy institutionally and politically. Using a similar process, the World Bank has assisted in the creation of the Independent Directorate of Local Authorities in Afghanistan.

Besides these efforts, several municipalities in the region have also actively sought to participate in international initiatives, particularly on issues of climate change, sustainability and resilience. Many cities in the MEWA region are part of the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy. UCLG has maintained an active presence in the region through the Istanbul-based regional headquarters of UCLG MEWA: in the past year, it has developed several dissemination initiatives in the region about the SDGs, aimed at training local governments and their officials on the process of localization through workshops and conferences. In 2018 and 2019, UCLG MEWA completed a pilot project to map SDG implementation: this was initially launched in Turkey — with the financial sponsorship and partnership of the World Academy for Local Government and Democracy (WALD). UCLG MEWA planned to use the project to integrate SDG-related municipal activities as widely as possible into the VNRs of the countries in the region. UCLG MEWA plans to disseminate the results and outcomes of the project throughout the region to incentivize mutual learning and collaboration.

In Jordan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has supported a dedicated “roadmap for the implementation of the SDGs with a 2030 time-horizon” to reinforce SDG-related initiatives in planning at the national and sub-national levels: this includes awareness-raising, mapping, mainstreaming and financing development initiatives. Jordan’s VNR — submitted in 2017 — stressed the participation of both elected municipal councils and appointed governorate councils to the reviewing process. Development-related priorities for the country’s 12 governorates, however, are still centralized through the Governorate Development Programmes: while these are ‘expected’ to be fully aligned with the SDGs, there is no significant evidence of actual implementation or integration of the Goals in the initiatives undertaken at the local level.

UN-Habitat has also been very active in Afghanistan, sponsoring several programmes in partnership with the national government and sub-national authorities. Even if designed outside the SDG framework, many of the 30 projects active on the ground since 2008 have a strong impact on the achievement of core SDG targets and development indicators in Afghan territories and communities. UNDP, as mentioned above, has also been a key player for SDG localization in the region. In Bahrain, UNDP — in partnership with other UN agencies such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Volunteers (UNV) — has aimed to engage young Bahrainis in the Capital Governorate to issue ‘Volunteering Passports’ in the SDG framework to increase awareness at the local level. In Saudi Arabia, a national-level UNDP-led project included a pillar dedicated to localization. Through UNDP support, moreover, the Riyadh Urban Observatory has engaged in discussion with local actors to promote the integration of the SDGs and their related indicators in the Observatory’s toolkit for monitoring and reporting on implementation in the city of Riyadh.

In Palestine, UNDP has organized awareness-raising workshops with the participation of sectoral, national and local-level representatives. In Syria, the agency has also been assisting governors in the preparation of their voluntary reviews. In Iraq, with the support of the national government, UNDP has set up a project to integrate the SDGs in the governorate level. Governorate Sustainable Development Committees (GSDCs) have been established to support implementation of NDPs (which are already aligned with the SDGs) and monitor implementation progress at the provincial level.
3.2 Local initiatives in line with the 2030 Agenda

Despite MEWA LRGs’ historical reliance on the support of national governments, evidence of innovative or ‘game-changing’ progress in the region’s countries is scarce: limited information on new programmes — catalysed by the SDGs or any other global agenda — is available about new lines of funding or support to local initiatives. There are, however, significant examples in Turkey, where several projects — mostly related to SDGs 3, 6, 10 and 11 — were clearly beneficial to SDG localization and increased policy consistency between central and local levels.\(^7\)

In other countries, certain governmental priorities have been consistent with some of the main objectives of the SDGs, and some of the policies that national governments and other tiers of governance have been able to develop are to an extent aligned with these agendas. Informal settlements, access to essential services and urban management challenges — all core elements of the commitments behind the SDGs — have been more and more central for national and local policy arenas across the MEWA region.

**Urban development**

The SDG closest to the reality and actual commitments and expectations of cities and local governments is SDG 11 on Sustainable Cities and Communities. Most of the advances, initiatives and strategic alignment of local governments within the framework of the SDGs have an impact on the implementation of SDG 11, even when there is no explicit reference to the Goals.

Over the past few years, several countries in the region have put in place urban development strategies as a tool to approach their main urban and territorial challenges, although the contents and objectives have been diverse. **Turkey**, for example, is implementing an Integrated Urban Development Strategy and Action Plan, with different sub-programmes designed to manage urban growth and sprawl; prevent disaster risk; promote urban regeneration and reduce regional disparities; develop integrated transit and transport in major cities; and curb sub-standard housing supply. **Saudi Arabia**, facing increasing urbanization rates, launched a National Spatial Strategy 2030 and a Future Saudi Cities Programme (in partnership with UN Habitat) to tackle urban sprawl reduction; promotion of spatially balanced planning and development; improvement of public transportation in and between major cities; national investment promotion towards less-developed regions; and empowering middle and small-sized cities.
and settlements as regional growth hubs. A major challenge will be the devolution of greater responsibilities to local governments. While local governments currently prepare local master plans and monitor their implementation, their autonomy is limited as higher-level officials have the power to overrule local decisions and central government transfers still account for 70% of local expenditures due to their low efficiency in revenue collection and the traditional provision of many public services free of charge.

In Afghanistan, one of the less urbanized countries of the region, the Ministry of Urban Development Affairs, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, and the Municipality of Kabul, in partnership with UN-Habitat, launched in 2014 (before the SDGs were established) the nationwide Future of Afghan Cities Programme (FoAC). After a successful database and reporting phase, which led to the publication of the State of Afghan Cities report in 2015, the programme moved to a second stage. In 2016, the partnership produced an atlas and a dataset of Afghan cities and regions. Similarly, the Afghan Citizens’ Charter project — in partnership with the World Bank and several local authorities — promotes the improvement of service and infrastructure delivery through the engagement of local communities by means of Community Development Councils. Qatar’s Ministry of Municipality and Environment, meanwhile, has developed a Sustainable Strategy 2018-2022 and plans to provide the country’s cities with support for food security, environmental protection, waste management and recycling.

Another dimension of specific provisions of the SDG 11.4 — cultural legacy and preservation — has been a controversial issue in planning and spatial policies in many countries of the MEWA region. Either in war-torn areas or because of structural indifference by political authorities, many Middle Eastern municipalities have witnessed destruction and abandonment of historical heritage and millennia-old settlements. Mosul, in Iraq, has already accessed financial assistance from the central government to rebuild the old city. The Turkish municipality of Altindag (a district of Ankara’s metro area) has renovated the once abandoned historical centre of Ankara, refurbishing it into a cultural hub for the city.

Many MEWA urban areas have experienced massive population influx, urban growth and major imbalances contributing to fast growth of informal settlements.

Informal settlements and social inclusion
Following trends of growing inequality and the displacement of refugees escaping conflict in several areas of the MEWA region, many urban areas have experienced massive population influx, urban growth and major imbalances contributing to fast growth of informal settlements. Lebanon’s dynamics of urban growth, exacerbated by an extremely high number of refugees, have led to the sprawl of larger cities. In 2015, 1.8 million people — 53.1% of the urban population — were living in informal settlements and urban slums.

In response to the inflow of Syrian refugees that started in 2011, Lebanon’s municipalities expanded services, schools opened their doors to refugee children, resulting in a doubling in enrolments and the ability of local governments to operate and maintain the educational system. Iran’s informal settlements today host about one third of the country’s urban population. The municipalities of Tehran and Isfahan have established specialized agencies that have been working with the Urban Development and Revitalization Organization (UDRO) on informal settlements and neighbourhood upgrading and renovation. Afghanistan’s Community-Led Urban Infrastructure Programme seeks to secure and stabilize urban areas through community empowerment and the improvement of living conditions. In Iraq, the Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS), in partnership with UNDP, the national government, and the governorates, has focused on rebuilding and renovating urban infrastructure.

Basic services
Inevitably, due to the climatic and geographic conditions of the region, issues of sustainable water consumption and provision and management of wastewaters have been crucial for national and local governments across the MEWA region, and especially in the desert areas in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. Desalinated water currently provides for over two-thirds of potable water used in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and 61% in Saudi Arabia. Water recycling, sanitation and waste management technologies have become essential alternative sources of water to meet a skyrocketing demand in the region’s urban areas. Almost all urban settlements in almost all countries of the region have some degree of water recycling and wastewater treatment system in place. In Turkey, for example, the number of domestic wastewater treatment facility passed from 126 in 2002 to 881 municipalities in 2018 and the rate of municipal population using the services increased from 35% to 75%. Within the same period, the percentage of population using safety managed drinking water passed from 95% to 99%. Following the
new legislation, municipalities shall reduce the rate of water loss, averaging 25% in 2023.81

Waste management has also traditionally posed a challenge to local governance in the region. The Greater Beirut area’s main landfill site was closed in 2015: since then the municipality has struggled to remedy this situation because of both inadequate financial resources and a centralized approach that has historically limited the ability of local government and stakeholders to address these issues.82 Gulf countries, thanks to a substantially different national economy, have been able to establish highly efficient landfill systems. Larger cities such as Doha, in Qatar, have even been able to invest in food and organic waste treatment for the production of compost and chemical products. In Oman, quite uniquely for the region, solid waste landfills are managed jointly by the general government and certain municipalities, including Muscat, the capital city, and Salalah. In Turkey, in the framework of the National Waste Management Plan, the number of municipal landfills increased to 88 providing services to 62.3 million inhabitants in 1,160 municipalities and three incineration plants. As of April 2019, in 499 municipalities packaging waste is collected separately at the source. A Zero Waste Project was initiated to foster and recover recycling (in the framework of a National Recycling Strategy). Municipalities with financing difficulties are supported by the Solid Waste Programme.83 The metropolitan municipality of Istanbul has established a network of container recycling across the city, the credits of which can be spent on public transport fees. Beirut has partnered with a domestic private waste management company to launch the first phase of a local waste recycling project. Again, exposing perhaps a regional susceptibility to the appeal of mega-planning, the city of Dubai has inaugurated its ‘Glow Garden’, a structure made out of 500,000 recyclable glass vials, porcelain ware, plastic bottles, dishes, and thousands of compact discs recovered from municipal waste — a reminder of the massive accumulation of waste in densely urbanized settlements.

Many other essential elements of the SDGs, e.g. transport and energy, are being increasingly integrated in the region’s municipal agendas. The debate on alternative and sustainable sources of energy and the improvement of public transportation — especially when considering the massive untapped potential for solar energy production in the whole area — is challenged by the easy access to fossil fuel energy in the region. However, several examples show growing progress in this regard. The city of Istanbul is developing efficient management of energy in municipal buildings, in facilities and parks. Several Turkish cities have developed public transport system projects (subway, light rail systems, trams) or created bicycle lanes (e.g. Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeli, Kayseri and Konya). Istanbul has been able to expand its public transport network, growing the underground network and infrastructures, while imposing some restrictions on private motorized transport. In Izmir, a solar power station was established on 10,000 m² of roofs by the local transport authority ESHOT General Directorate. This station aims to meet the energy needs of 20 ESHOT buses fully powered by electricity.84 Malatya, also in Turkey, already uses electric bus vehicles with routes that allow for battery recharging. Qazvin, in Iran, signed a deal in 2018 with a Chinese company to build the country’s first tram network. Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, has allocated an investment of USD 16 billion to fund an underground system extending 178 km according to the plans. At the same time, Qatar and some of the UAE (including Abu Dhabi, the largest state of the country) have been developing green building ratings and certifications, in order to integrate the latest environmental construction standard in their national regulation.85

Box 1

Resilience plan actions in Byblos, Ramallah and Amman

Consistent with the participatory approach of the 100RC initiatives, the experiences and activities that the cities of Amman (Jordan), Byblos (Lebanon) and Ramallah (Palestine) have put into practice have helped identify major resilience challenges, as shaped by local conditions and structures. They have also assisted the development of plans that truly reflect local priorities and concerns. Byblos’ resilience plan was developed through dialogue with key stakeholders — the Municipal Council, government ministries, the police, NGOs, academic institutions, and civic groups. The plan prioritizes municipal data collection and use as a prerequisite for improved planning and city management. In Ramallah, the preparation of the resilience plan involved working groups from the Municipal Council, universities and the private sector, as well as conversations with local political and community leaders. A similar process was followed in Amman for the preparation of its resilience plan. Transport was a critical component for the Jordanian capital, and required the development of an integrated mobility plan: this includes a three-corridor Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) network to open in 2019, and the enhancement of walkability, especially through the creation of a railway corridor park. All these measures add to initiatives against climate change, and the improvement of digital connectedness, urban infrastructure and participatory mechanisms.

Source: 100 Resilient Cities network (https://www.100resilientcities.org).
Resilient cities and territories

Local governments in the MEWA region have been developing innovative approaches to improve resilience and sustainability in their territories and communities. Amman in Jordan, Byblos in Lebanon and Ramallah in Palestine, for example, have all joined the 100 Resilient Cities (100RC) network: the membership helped the municipalities assess the status of their resilience outlook and develop state-of-the-art strategic planning to adequately meet resilience criteria.

In Turkey, 141 Urban Regeneration and Development Projects Areas and ten Renovation Areas in cities are being developed with the support of the government (USD 2.83 billion spent since 2012). Many cities, such as the Kocaeli Metropolitan Municipality are implementing a Disaster Management and Decision Support System Project (AYDES) with the national Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD). The project implements an electronic tracking and management system for all stages of integrated disaster management.86

With the Aqaba Declaration,87 approved at the first Arab Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction,88 in 2013, under the aegis of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and UNDP, Arab countries and members of the League of Arab Countries acknowledged the risks and vulnerabilities of Arab cities in the face of climate change, earthquakes, desertification, and flooding. The signatories committed to dedicate part of their budget to risk prevention and preparedness, awareness-raising and education on resilience and climate change, with particular attention given to vulnerable cultural heritage and protected sites, among several other measures.

Environment and climate change

Climate change, which is central to the policy commitments and innovation framework of the SDGs, is also a key issue for local governments and a fundamental challenge tackled by local initiatives and activities. Besides SDG 13 on climate change, environmental, resilience and sustainability issues are at the core of SDG 7 on clean energy, SDG 11 on cities and human settlements, SDG 12 on sustainable production and consumption, SDG 14 on life below water and SDG 15 on life on earth. Throughout the MEWA region, many municipalities have developed initiatives and policies that refer to a number of these Goals’ targets: 30 cities have made commitments within the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy in 2019.89

In Jordan, the Greater Amman Municipality has committed since 2015 to a plan to become a green city by 2020. In Turkey, several frontrunning cities and municipalities have been implementing climate action plans for years, and have also been joining various international networks active in this field.90 Following a regulation passed in 2017, municipalities are expected to increase green areas in their spatial planning and improve accessibility to green areas. Taking initiative on air pollution, the number of air quality monitoring stations increased from 36 in 2007 to 253 in 2017. Several regional authorities, moreover, have developed air quality improvement plans.91

The municipality of Tehran organizes an annual Organic Week Festival to promote sustainable land-use patterns. The Corniche Area park, in the municipality of Abu Dhabi, in an internationally awarded structure which embodies the country’s quest to join the highest global standards in planning and management of public and green spaces. Qatari cities are promoting the development of desert campsites as a way to fund natural resource protection and alleviate touristic pressure on coastal localities. Similarly, the central government is funding sustainable greenhouse farming in cities. These kind of interventions — as is the case with similar mega-planning or top-down solutions — are fairly endemic in the Gulf region, where local government can count on significant financial support from the national level.
In Iran, on the other hand, the Ministry for Health and the Tehran Municipality have joined forces with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). This has been to improve air pollution analysis equipment throughout the city, historically affected by extremely high levels of pollution.

Many cities in the region, maintain policy competences over coastline protection and regulation, with a strong impact on marine environment and sea life preservation. The city of Istanbul, for example, has managed waste collection in the Bosphorus and the Golden Horn: in the first three-quarters of 2018 alone, the city recovered 140 trucks of waste. The municipality of Shahama, embedded in the Abu Dhabi metro area in the UAE, has allocated parts of its budget to ecosystem protection for the marine environment specific to the Abu Dhabi region.

**International cooperation**

The role of international donors and cooperation agencies has been significant as well. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the cooperation branch of the Swedish Association of Local Governments (SLK International) partnered in Iraq with the Al Qaddissiyah and Dohuk governorates to establish the ‘Governance in Social Care’ project (2012-2017). This project supported improvements in social care at the sub-national level. In Lebanon, assistance by European LGAs and international institutions has been crucial to sustain healthcare, education and relief provision to the refugee population and other vulnerable groups not directly covered by UN relief efforts.

In Jordan, the governorate of Al-Mafraq partnered with the City of Amstterdam and VNG International (VNGi, the cooperation branch of the Dutch national LGA) to develop a Municipal Assistance Programme for the Al Za’atari Refugee Camp. VNGi also worked in Jordan, with funding from USAID, with the Cities Implementing Transparent Innovative and Effective Solutions (CITIES) programme. The project provides technical assistance to governorates and municipal stakeholders to translate administrative reforms into innovative and sustainable solutions for service delivery, participatory mechanisms, and community cohesion and stability — to improve citizens’ awareness, responsiveness and resilience. Donor assistance has been essential particularly in the case of Palestine, where municipalities have extremely scarce resources and political leeway and are often unable to address local policy issues autonomously. Palestinian cities have depended on external aid for public service and infrastructure provision and local economic development (see Box 2 for an example, specifically cooperation with the Dutch government). Additionally, in 2005 Palestine established an MDLF, an independent public institution, which assists local governments in economic development promotion. While many of the stakeholders involved have been responsive and aware of the SDG framework, actual localization in the State of Palestine has hardly progressed, mostly due to periodic violence and conflict in the area (and the Gaza Strip especially), and the continued Israeli occupation in the West Bank. In assessing the reach and impact of the SDG framework and the other global agendas in the MEWA region, this section shows activities and initiatives that are contributing to the localization process. However, because of structural circumstances of the region, most progress and initiatives have been the prerogative of national governments, occasionally with the involvement or consultation of LRGs and local stakeholders. As a rule of thumb, the motivation, commitment and leadership of LRGs in the localization of the SDGs has a clear correlation with the degree of (planned) decentralization and/or the level of wealth and financial resources available at the national level.

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**Box 2**

**Local Government Capacity Programme (LGCP), Palestinian Territory**

Building on the successful history of collaboration between Palestinian local authorities and VNGi, the Local Government Capacity Programme (LGCP), in place from 2012-2016, focused on local economic development in the Palestinian territory. The collaboration led to positive outcomes in sustainable development, lower unemployment and increased food security, thus helping improve the legitimacy of local governments in their communities. The Dutch government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, backed an approach that promoted local self-sufficiency: the LGCP initially supported the activities of 12 local governments in the West Bank, providing both funds and the capacity to stimulate local economic development. The project was carried out under the umbrella of the MDLF, through which the most important donors to the area work together with the Palestinian Authority. Selected local governments could submit applications for financial and technical support for projects, workshops, on-the-job coaching and training. The municipality of Bethlehem was the first to establish a Council for Local Economic Development, together with the private sector and civil society, an output of the project’s participatory spirit, which put particular emphasis on the establishment of strategic business alliances.

Despite the immense socio-economic, cultural and historical diversity of the MEWA region, certain trends in the way in which countries approach the SDG framework and the global commitments of the new agendas help elicit some region-wide conclusions. With the exception of Afghanistan and Yemen, the MEWA region is now (and increasingly) highly urbanized, and it is estimated that its cities will have to accommodate over 96 million new residents by 2030. An exceptionally large youth cohort will continue to fuel the intense demand for jobs, housing and services that — with the exception perhaps of Gulf countries, thanks to their reliance on the economy of hydrocarbons — all countries in the MEWA region will struggle to meet.

In recent years, recurring civil strife in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen have exacerbated the challenge of the region’s high urbanization rate. War has destroyed urban infrastructure and torn the socio-cultural fabric apart. This damage has rapidly spilled over to neighbouring countries because of successive, overwhelming waves of refugees displaced by region-wide conflict. Against this gloomy backdrop, several MEWA countries have made impressive progress in accomplishing human and economic development advances — thus contributing to the achievement of several SDGs — despite the consequences and impact of conflict. However, socio-economic and gender inequalities remain major challenges for all countries in the region.

Ultimately, in the MEWA region as in the rest of the world, urban planning and territorial management are shared responsibilities in a complex and evolving mechanism in which central, regional and local authorities should work together to a varying degree of engagement and effectiveness. In the MEWA countries specifically, however, political and financial resources are still concentrated in national ministries and presidential offices: the devolution of responsibilities to the provincial, metropolitan or local level has been partial at best, and such woeful progress has had significant consequences.

On the one hand, inconsistent devolution has provided most MEWA cities — with perhaps the exception of Turkish municipalities — with an uncertain, unreliable mandate and strategic outlook to plan and manage urbanization and urban expansion and development. This has affected the ability of local governments to include the mission and scope of the SDGs and the other global agendas in their own policy-making: thus, the dimensions of sustainability, inclusiveness and policy co-creation have inevitably been undermined. On the other hand, the financing issue is still essential for the quality and effectiveness of local government in the region.

Municipalities, provinces and other local authorities across MEWA countries still lack adequate financial resources and mandates to fund a proactive role in a truly multilevel governance (MLG) in the region. This has translated into an endemic inability to fund service provision and infrastructural assets, with the public sector especially compromised. The sole exception in the MEWA region is the Gulf area. However the uniqueness of those countries’ highly centralized political systems and the unprecedented resources available to them through the extraction economy make their local governments a case study whose features can hardly be replicated elsewhere. State-fed funds have nurtured an approach to local policy-making that relies on mega-planning urbanism and has concealed — when it has not neglected them altogether — issues of inequality, marginalization and unaccountable or non-democratic rule.

There are several constraints on local governments and public administration to fully contribute to governance and policy-making.
Inadequate property records and the specific organization of tax revenue and collection systems (many MEWA local governments, for example, are still unable to collect user fees reliably), in particular, have been hindering the capacity of local governments to fund themselves and the provision of basic public services. If MEWA local governments expect to play an active, guiding role in the implementation of the SDGs and the other global agendas — such as the New Urban Agenda, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Paris Climate Agreement — they will need enhanced, reliable, effective local financing sources. Capturing their fair share of land-value appreciation following public investment and improvement will be essential to funding infrastructure and delivering better and more inclusive services.

Finally, the combination of the region’s geography and ecology and the organization of urban, territorial and spatial planning have made environmental challenges and the pressures of climate change particularly threatening for MEWA local governments and cities. With the exception of Turkey and Iran, all other countries in the region are already using water at unsustainable rates — as skyrocketing demand meets stagnating supply, dwindling reserves and an average 20%-40% loss of water due to obsolescence or lack of maintenance of underfunded distribution networks. Similarly, while access to improved sanitation systems has increased in almost all countries, these statistics tend also to include poorer-quality, on-site sanitation systems, with a high social and environmental cost, in most precarious or informal settlements. Full high-capital water-borne systems, in fact, have often not been expanded to cover newly urbanized areas or more informal neighbourhoods, with a strong impact on quality of life and socio-economic equality.

Similarly, waste management and disposal have been lacking in many urban systems across the region, with strong spatial inequalities in service provision and delivery. Recycling, moreover, is not yet socially or economically rooted in the urban culture of the area, and has not provided the same kind of relief on environmental impact as it has in more aware regions or urban systems.

Traffic congestion is historically crippling in the region’s larger cities, and generally mobility across MEWA countries is highly dependent on motorized private transport (even mass transportation is usually performed, more or less informally, with private and obsolete vehicles). Reliance on motorized, polluting vehicles has reached unsustainable levels in many countries, with high environmental impact and economic costs that considerably hinder the achievement of all related SDGs and targets. Any improvement in this regard, however, will inevitably require the devolution of more and better spatial control and development authority to the local level, alongside the adoption of consistent and full-fledged National Urban Policies (NUPs), integrated with strategies and plans across all levels. The impact on health, inequality and socio-economic opportunity makes this point particularly important with regard to the actual localization of the SDGs and their co-ownership at local and territorial levels.

Ultimately, balancing the growing pressure of rapid urbanization and the achievement of the SDGs and making them compatible in a complicated and diverse region such as MEWA will require a major investment of political will and commitment. Even in spite of the historical legacy of strongly centralized governance systems and the intense pressure of conflict, war and destruction in many areas of the region, cities and territories have an opportunity to become engines of growth and drivers of change for the whole region.

To be effective, the next steps for MEWA countries must include increased autonomy and resources devolved to more engaged and efficient local governments; increased capacities to provide, maintain and effectively deliver basic public services and infrastructural development (all the more important in war-torn territories); and a consistent governance mechanism able to empower a growing youth and urbanized population, allowing them to truly co-own their future and their land, and embrace the opportunities offered by the SDGs.

Even in spite of centralized governance and the intense pressure of conflict and war, MEWA cities and territories have an opportunity to become engines of growth.